Authoritarianism, Germany and the Military in the 20th Century

It can be argued that authoritarianism in Germany by 1934 was the inevitable result of the Military’s influence and the dominant Military culture of Germany more widely and that Hitler’s rise to power was the result of an intentful exploitation of this.

The ‘Sonderweg’ theory states that Germany had an intrinsic and historic Military culture that permeated it’s society and mode of politics. Particularly before the Weimar constitution, Military decisions such as the Army budget took priority in the Reichstag, and laws like the Septennial Law 1874 proved the significant influence and power politics that the Military had. Preference of Militarism over democracy in Germany can be shown as early as 1913 during the Zabern Affair, which showcased how the Military was above the Law and exempt from the democratic structure. This can also be seen at the secret Military meeting held in December 1912, in which all non-military persons were not invited to attend. It is clear that even before the establishment of a constitutional democracy in Germany, that people supported the dominance of the Military over the constitutional process.

It has also been argued by historians that the German Military culture resulted in a dominance of authoritarian views in individuals. Most men in Germany would have completed the minimum term of Military service before 1918, exposing them to the authoritarian structure and philosophy of the Military, thus instilling these attitudes. By 1918, 13.5 million Germans (⅕ of the population) was enrolled in Military service, meaning an entire generation of Germans would inevitably be more likely to support the authoritarian campaign of Hitler by the late 20’s and early 30’s.

Hitler certainly exploited this facet of German culture to take power. He was perhaps the only politician representing the hard-right against leftist politics and the compliance of other politicians with the Treaty of Versailles and continued reparations. Certainly many Germans were dissatisfied with the status quo and the large ex-service population of Germany were resentful of the neutering of the Military by foreign intervention, whereas Hitler promised to rebuild Germany’s military power to a level stronger than ever before.

Indeed, after the Munich Putsch 1923, at which Hitler attempted to take power through chaotic revolutionary means, he realised this method would be ineffective toward his target base of supporters. Instead, Hitler would take the route of incremental gain through the apparatus of the existing constitution. This was significant as this process appealed to the orderly character trait of Militaristic individuals and of Conservative Germans in general, unlike the chaotic method of social revolution associated with left-wing radicalism. Hitler also increased his propaganda campaign with his Propaganda Minister Jospeh Goebbels, which was anti semitic and often Militarily oriented.

However, Hitler’s utilization of his own SA (of which had around 4 million members by 1934) had the genuine Military officials in Germany unsympathetic to his campaign. Hitler purged himself of hundreds of his own party members that he feared disloyalty from in the future and many of his SA generals during the Night of the Long Knives in June 1934. The victims included high officials such as Ernst Rohm, Von Schleicher and Gregor Strasser. This act by Hitler secured him support from the Military Generals and businessmen in Germany, as by eliminating the SA leadership he would remove the possibility of protest for his plans to suppress workers right in order to rapidly rebuild the German Military.

In conclusion, it is possible to say that from the very beginning of democracy in Germany that it was doomed for failure, as it would forever be immediately associated with the loss of the war and the economic and social disparity that followed. The German culture was evidently not prepared to accept democracy, and that a rapid transition from a monarchical military structure to a totally modernized democracy would never succeed. For just under the first decade of the Weimar constitution, the Government was unable to rely on it’s official military and thus resorted to the use of the right-wing militia group (the Freikorps) to quell widespread revolutions and coupes from both the left and right of Germany. The new Government was opposed in the Spartacist revolution and in the Kapp and Munich Putsch, both of which saw no participation from the Military to help calm them, rather famously, General Siekt said “soldiers don’t shoot soldiers”.

The end of democracy by 1934 was more widely accepted than democracy itself, though it had partly been achieved through deception and exploitation. After the Reichstag fire in 1933 Hitler was able to pass the ‘Law for the Protection of People and State’ allowing Hitler to suppress his political opponents indiscriminately. Despite Hitler’s overt authoritarianism, the German public still gave him a mandate to make himself supreme leader of Germany, passing the Enabling Act, thus allowing him to establish a one party state through the ‘Law against the Establishment of Parties’, and by August, after the death of Hindenburg, Hitler was able to assume both the Presidential mantle and that of the Chancellorship, thus becoming the Fuhrer, with many still as fervent supporters to his regime.

- an essay by FabiusSideman